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Nicht technische Zusammenfassung
Der Beitrag von Venture Capital Finanzierung auf Unternehmenswachstum und Innovations-
geschehen ist derzeit ein stark diskutiertes Thema. Generell wird davon ausgegangen, dass
Venture Capital finanzierte Unternehmen signifikant ho¨here Innovationsaktivita¨ten aufweisen
und deren Unternehmenswachstum außergewo¨hnlich hoch ist. Das vorliegende Papier mo¨chte
zu dieser Debatte beitragen. Wir analysieren den Einfluss von Venture Capital Finanzierung
auf Innovationsverhalten und Unternehmenswachstum fu¨r Start-Ups in Deutschland. Neben
anderen Variablen entha¨lt unser Unternehmenspanel Daten zu Venture Capital Finanzierung
und zu Patentanmeldungen am Deutschen Patentamt. Auf Basis eines statistischen Match-
ingverfahrens ziehen wir eine ada¨quate Kontrollgruppe von Unternehmen, die nicht Venture
Capital finanziert, jedoch ansonsten sehr a¨hnlich sind. Die Analyse zeigt, dass innovative
Firmen mit ho¨herer Wahrscheinlichkeit einen Venture Capital Deal abschließen ko¨nnen. Sie
zeigt weiterhin, dass Venture Capital finanzierte Firmen tatsa¨chlich ho¨here Wachstumsraten
aufweisen, wenn auch der Unterschied wesentlich geringer ist, als allgemein angenommen. Das
Innovationsverhalten von Venture Capital finanzierten Firmen unterscheidet sich nach Eintritt
des Venture Capitalisten nicht mehr von den Unternehmen der Kontrollgruppe. Wir schließen
daraus, dass Venture Capitalisten eher innovative Firmen finanzieren, dass sie jedoch mit Be-
ginn des Engagements versta¨rkt auf die Vermarktung der Produkte hinwirken; dies fu¨hrt dann
zu ho¨herem Unternehmenswachstum.
Non technical summary
Recently, the impact of venture capital to innovation and economic growth has widely been
discussed. It is claimed that venture funded firms are more innovative and show tremendously
higher growth rates. This paper aims to contribute to that debate. The paper analyses the im-
pact of venture capital finance on growth and innovation activities of young German firms.
Amongst other variables, our panel of firm data includes data on venture capital funding and
patent applications. With a statistical matching procedure we draw an adequate control group
of non venture funded firms. The analysis gives evidence that innovative firms will be able to
close a venture capital deal with higher probability. Once the firms are venture funded, they
display higher growth rates but do not differ in their innovative output from otherwise com-
parable firms. We conclude from these findings that in an attempt to maximize sales, venture
capital investors assist their portfolio firms in their effort to commercialization, rather than in
further innovation. Commercialization is probably done by financial means but also by means
of management assistance. It is also possible that venture investors are more aware of possible
commercialization channels.
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1 Introduction 1
1 Introduction
Between 1995 and 2000 the German venture capital market has made an extraodinary
evolution in that the the volume of newly closed deals has increased by a factor of
nearly 8. One major factor in this regard was certainly the introduction of the “Neuer
Markt”, the German correspondence to the NASDAQ, and the exit opportunities re-
lated to it. A second major factor was the diffusion and adoption of information and
communication technologies that were expected to exhibit large growth rates but re-
quired large initial investments that classic banks were usually not able to finance.
Finally, a third factor in Germany was the influence of the “Technologiebeteiligungs-
gesellschaft (tbg)”, a public organization that co-invests with private lead investors to
double the volume of the deal. Moreover, it acts similar to an insurance, i.e. it partly
covers the risk of failure of a deal.
The commitment of the German government to ease the access of technology ori-
ented firms to funds is based on the assumption, that young and technology oriented
firms are more innovative and therefore will more easily be able to open or capture
new market niches. Thus, these firms are supposed to exhibit higher growth rates and
therefore to foster structural adjustments of the economy. If these firms are provided
with venture capital and with the corresponding services (such as mangement support)
- so the implicit assumption - they will be able to perform even better.
In this paper, we investigate this assumptions empirically. Is it true that venture
funded firms perform better in terms of employment growth rates and innovative out-
put? To do so, we set up a new dataset on young German firms. For each of these firms,
apart of a number of firm-specific, industry specific or regional variables, we identify
whether the firm has been venture capital funded or not. By merging this dataset with
data from the German Patent Office, we are able to describe the innovative behaviour
of these firms by proxying innovative output with the number of patent applications.
Then venture capital funded firms are compared with others in terms of growth rate
and innovative output using a statistical matching approach. This approach reduces
statistical biases that would occur if firms of different characteristics would be com-
pared.
The paper gives evidence on several levels: Firms with high innovation output are
able to engage a venture capitalist with higher probability. Once a venture capitalist
is involved, firms show higher employment growth rates but no significant differences
in innovative output. We conclude from this findings that after venture capitalists’ in-
volvements, firms switch from innovation to commercialization of their products and
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this way are able to realize superior growth rates.
The following section gives an overview on the literature on the implications of
venture capital funding on firm growth and innovation, section 3 presents the dataset,
section 4 presents the evalutation procedure, results are dicussed in sections 5 and 6.
2 On the Impact of Venture Capital Funding on Growth
and Innovative Behaviour of Firms - A Survey on the
Literature
venture capital is a financing form suitable for projects or ventures that involve large
financial requirements and high uncertainty about risks involved but at the same time
a high potential for growth hence potentially large profits. A deal between a venture
capitalist and a Portfolio Firm implies that the former provides venture Funding but
also management advice to close the gap in managing non-technical shortcomings
(Amit et al., 1998, Berger and Udell, 1998, Gompers and Lerner, 1999).
Very often, the selection of portfolio firms is made under the assumption that inno-
vative firms have a higher growth potential and therefore offer larger potential profits.
In this section we give a survey on the literature on venture capital an its relation to
firm performance and innovation.
2.1 On Venture Capital and Firm Growth
A number of recent studies examine empirically the relationship between receiving
venture capital and firm performance (see Schefczyk(2000) for a detailed overview).
Sapienza(1992) found that the provided services are positively related to the perfor-
mance of venture funded firms. Jain and Kini(1995) show that venture funded firms
publicly offered at stockmarkets have a higher cash flow and sales growth. Lerner
(1999) evaluates the longrun success of firms participating in the Small Business In-
novation Research (SBIR) program, a major public assistance initiative in the United
States for hightechnology firms. Those firms receiving assistance from SBIR achieve
significantly higher employment and sales growth rates than similar No-SBIR assisted
firms between 1983 and 1995. These differences are even more pronounced in ZIP
codes with high venture capital activity. The findings of Manigart and Hyfte(1999) for
187 Belgian venture funded firms are quite different. Belgian venture funded firms do
not achieve a significant higher employment growth compared to non venture funded
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firms of the same industries, of similar size, and similar age. However, higher growth
rates in total assets and cash flow are obvious. Buergel et al.(2000) do not observe any
significant effect of venture capital finance on firms’ sales and employment growth.
Their multivariate analysis of the determinants of firm growth is based on a question-
naire of 500 German and British high-tech start-ups. In a study by Coopers&Lybrand
and EVCA it is found that venture funded firms grew more than seven times faster than
the European top 500 firms. This is impressive, however it remains unclear what drives
this difference since the choice of the control group seems not to be made appropri-
ately within that study.1 The approach to be used in this paper (discussed in section 4)
will take this into account.
2.2 On Venture Capital and Firms’ Innovative Bevahiour
Despite the increasing importance of venture capital investment, the relation between
this type of investment and the innovative behaviour of firms has been analyzed only
rarely. For Germany, to our knowledge, there does not exist any analysis. Kortum and
Lerner(1998, 2000) examine the influence of venture capital on patented innovation
in the US. Their analysis is based on data on manufacturing industries between 1965
and 1992, using observations on counts of issued patents and venture funding. Using a
number of different structural forms of a patent production function, they estimate the
productivity of venture capital financed innovation projects to be significantly higher
as compared to projects financed by private R&D funds, although these estimates differ
widely according to the specification of the regression equation2.
The authors also address the concern that this result might be due to a different
patenting behaviour of venture funded firms due to strategic reasons. Obviously, a
firm in search for venture capital will increase its chances to close a deal when it
proofs its innovative performance to be high. Then, a corresponding strategy would
be to apply for a maximum of patents. A second reason for firms seeking for venture
investment to have stronger incentives to patent might be the fact that every application
for venture funding implies disclosure of underlying ideas. These might subsequently
be exploited by venture investors if not protected by patents. Both reasons would lead
to a significant positive bias in the number of patent applications, and probably in the
number of subsequently issued patents. However, if this bias is a mere consequence
1Section 4 discusses this problem in detail.
2Depending on the form of the regression equation, they estimate this difference between 1.5 and
40, most of the estimation results lying between 1.5 and 3.
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of strategic behaviour, we should expect a negative correlation between the number of
awarded patents of a firms and the value of these patents.
Using then a sample of 530 firms, Kortum and Lerner could show that venture
funded firms do not only receive a larger number of patent awards but also higher
scores concerning different value correlated variables (such as citations and law suits).
They take these findings as evidence in favor of the hypothesis that venture funded
firms are more innovative, producing a larger and higher valued stock of patents.
The approach chosen in this paper is different compared to the one chosen by Ko-
rtum and Lerner in that it uses firm level data instead of industry data. This approach
enables us to identify a number of firm specific variables that can be expected to influ-
ence firms’ growth and innovative performance. We are also able to identify the time
of venture vapitalists’ engagement and hence to compare the firms’ performance be-
fore and after that. Based on a generalized matching approach we are able to compare
firms with and without venture financing but otherwise similar. The following section
describes the data, section 4 gives a short overview on the matching process.
3 The Data
Our analysis is based on the ZEW-Foundation Panels. This firm specific data is pro-
vided to the ZEW since 1990 by Creditreform, the largest German credit rating agency
(see Almus, Engel and Prantl (2000) for more details). This dataset comprises virtu-
ally all firms registered in the German trade register. However, the entry probability
of unregistered firms depends on the scope of their credit demand and of their busi-
ness relations to other firms. Firms are entered in the database only with a time lag.
Thus, only 60 percent of the start-ups being founded since 2000 are recorded for the
first time enquired by Creditreform by January 2002. Therefore, the analysis focuses
on new firms with foundation date between 1995 and 1998 to avoid selection prob-
lems inside the cohorts. With this database we cover virtually all firm start-ups from
that time period that received venture capital. The Data is updated regularly through
biannual data deliveries (waves) by Creditreform which allows us to build up a panel
structure. Updates cover information on previously surveyed firms and information
about newly created firms.
This database covers a number of firms specific variables, such as number of firms’
employees, foundation date, main economic activity (i.e. industry affiliation expressed
by NACE classification), legal state, details on natural and legal owners, owners lia-
3 The Data 5
bility status and finally firms’ addresses. A number of variables concerning the envi-
ronment of firms can be derived from the latter. This includes e.g. information on the
population density of the region of the firm or distances to different types of scientific
research centers. The database does not explicitly cover information on whether the
firm is venture funded, on the firms’ growth rate or on the number of patents applied
for by each firm. These variables are computed or merged with information from other
sources.
The identification of venture funded firms is based on a computer-assisted string
search (including information on names and office of venture capital companies) in
the variables covering ownership information. All venture capital companies that are
private equity investors and full members of European venture capital Association
(EVCA) or German venture capital Association e.V. (BVK) are considered (BVK,
2000b, 2000a; EVCA, 2000). Associate members are not taken into consideration be-
cause their business activities focus on management support. Additionally, members
of U.S. National venture capital Association are considered with activities in 1999 at
the U.S. venture capital market (VentureOne, 1999) and a search for key words like
“venture capital”, “Private Equity” is done to identify firms with obvious venture cap-
ital activities. We did not include ventures with a silent partner (such as e.g. business
angels) since they are not recorded in the trade register (Jacobs and Scheffler, 1998).
However, exclusively silent partnerships do not play an important role in early stage
financing of profit accounting venture capitalists (see Engel(2001) for further explana-
tions).
The Rate of Average Annual Employment Growth gi for each firm i is computed as
gi 
lnEitl  lnEitk
tl  tk
 (1)
where tk tl denote time instances tl  tk and Eit denotes the number of employees of
firm i at time t. Note that tk and tl might be different for firms of different cohorts.
Innovative behaviour is measured using count data on patent applications at the
German Patent Office (DPA). To apply for a patent at the DPA implies lower fees
as compared to applications ath the European Patent Office (EPO). This implies that
smaller firms that are not able (or not willing) to bring up the higher fees will apply at
the DPA alone. On the other hand, applications at the EPO that cover the German ter-
ritory will be appear in the DPA dataset(PATDPA). Hence, we can expect the German
database to be more complete.
The assignment of patent applications to firms is realized using a computer-assisted
merging procedure similar to the one used for identification of venture funded firms.
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Both data bases, the firm data and the patent application data cover information on the
firms’ names and their location. The merging algorithm synchronizes both databases
using the information in these strings.
We limit the analysis to industries with ocurrence of at least one venture funded
firm. Also, we do not consider firms with legal forms other than Limited Partnership
(GmbH or GmbH & Co. KG) or Public Limited Companies (AG) since, due to their
liablity status, the registration of entry time in the underlying database can be very
biased. Thus, our database covers 50,754 non venture funded firms and 274 venture
funded firms (corresponding to 0.53 % of the sample).
Table 1 enumerates the variables in the dataset. Columns 2 and 3 of this Table show
the mean value of each variable for each of these set of firms as well as the results of a
statistical test for identity. The values express shares unless expressed otherwise where
shares are not meaningful. In this dataset we included only firms that have at least
two entries with respect to their firm size such that a growth rate can be computed
according to equation (1). This reduces the number of non venture funded firms to
21,375 and of venture funded-firms to 142 (i.e. 0.66%).
Table 1: Difference between venture funded firms and control group
Shares (unless denoted otherwise)
Firm characteristics at foundation VF NVF
Firm-specific characteristics
Startup size (number of employees) 6979 5165
Limited Partnership (GmbH & Co KG 0148 0092
Public limited company (AG) 0099 0016
Involvement of other (non VC) firms 0472 0279
Team foundation 0620 0451
Founding team of mixed gender 0106 0123
Founders are of female gender 0014 0103
Gender Unknown 0120 0083
Qualification of Founders
Doctoral Degree 0289 0078
Postgraduate Degree 0528 0385
Higher Education on the Job 0014 0074
Medium Education on the Job 0254 0389
Low Education 0021 0028
Education Level unknown 0296 0244
Patenting Behavior
Continued on next page
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Table 1: (continued)
Shares (unless denoted otherwise)
Firm characteristics at foundation VF NVF
No patents until foundation date 0894 0979
One patent until foundation date 0035 0009
2...4 patent until foundation date 0028 0008
5...19 patent until foundation date 0042 0004
20...49 patent until foundation date 0000 0000
Industry affiliation (with Nace code)
Manuf. of food products etc. (15) 0007 0021
Manuf. of wearing apparel etc. (18) 0007 0005
Manuf. of wood and its products etc. (20) 0014 0015
Publishing, printing etc. (22) 0021 0045
Manuf. of chemicals and chemical products (24) 0028 0014
Manuf. of rubber and plastic products (25) 0007 0020
Manuf. of other non-metallic mineral products (26) 0021 0023
Manuf. of fabricated metal products etc. (28) 0021 0071
Manuf. of machinery and equipment n.e.c. (29) 0021 0060
Manuf. of office machinery and computers (30) 0021 0011
Manuf. of electrical machinery and apparatus n.e.c. (31) 0042 0015
Manuf. of radio, television and communication equipment (32) 0021 0010
Manuf. of medical, precision and optical instruments etc. (33) 0035 0039
Manuf. of motor vehicles, trailers and semi-trailers (34) 0014 0012
Manuf. of furniture; manufacturing n.e.c. (36) 0007 0022
Recycling (37) 0021 0014
Postal and telecommunication services (64) 0007 0005
Computer and related activities (72) 0197 0129
Research and development (73) 0148 0024
Other business activities (740) 0007 0006
Business Related Services (741) 0148 0144
Architectural and engineering activities (742) 0049 0135
Technical testing and analysis (743) 0000 0000
Advertising (744) 0042 0047
Industrial cleaning (747) 0007 0016
Misc. business activities n.e.c. (748) 0085 0098
Foundation date
1995 0070 0152
1996 0134 0237
Continued on next page
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Table 1: (continued)
Shares (unless denoted otherwise)
Firm characteristics at foundation VF NVF
1997 0373 0304
1998 0423 0307
Regional Characteristics
Firm is located in Eastern Germany 0204 0207
Located in Bavaria 0197 0151
Firm is located in Brandenburg 0028 0036
Population Density in 1996 (corresponding counties) 6940 6389
Distance to nearest science or technology part 2704 2760
Scientific personnel in Universities within 50 km dist. 7609 7657
Distance to next Fraunhofer-Institute 2725 3126
Distance to next Helmholtz-Institute 3053 3492
R&D Employees in industry 7350 6523
Other
Estim. average unbounded Prop. Score X  ˆβ 2081 2797
Average Annual Employment Growth 0326 0174
Entry has been edited within last year 0923 0877
Nr. of observations 142 21,375
***/**/* Difference of mean is significant from zero at 1/5/10 per cent level of significance.
VF: venture funded firms, begin of involvement is latest twelve months after
foundation date, NVF: non venture funded firms.
Data sources: ZEW Foundation Panels,
German Patent Agency, Federal Office for Regional Planning.
This table shows that in average, venture funded firms have a larger startup size, they
have a larger management3, their founders are higher qualified, they have a larger num-
ber of patents at foundation date, they are less frequent in traditional sectors (such as
mechanical engineering) but more frequent in R&D intensive and computer related in-
dustries. Finally, they are more than proportional they are founded after 1996 (the take-
off year of the German venture capital Market) and they are created in more densely
populated areas but with larger distance to applied research centers. Also, we see at
the bottom of Table 1 that firms differ significantly in their average annual employ-
ment growth rate.
3We derive this from that they more fequently are founded as Public Limited Company and have
more that one founder.
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Table 2 compares average growth rates of venture funded and non venture funded
firms grouped into different industry aggregates. Based on these figures, we are driven
to the conclusion that venture funded firms grow faster on average, however this dif-
ference is driven only by the technology intensive service (which includes software
developers) subgroup. Section 5 will show if these results hold after applying a mi-
croeconometric matching procedure.
Table 3 compares average number of patent applications of firms in the sample on
the industry level using different industry aggregeates. Based on these tests, we are
driven to the conclusion that venture funded firms show a significantly larger number
of patent-applications compared to their non venture funded colleagues. The figures
in this table differ in magnitude from those given by Kortum and Lerner(2000, Table
6), the ratio of patent applications from venture funded firms to non venture funnnded
firms is however roughly the same. This difference is due to the fact that we consider
only young firms. Again, these results will be reconsidered in section 5.
Means p-value*
VF NVF
All Firms 0.367 0.193 0.003
(Number of firms) (216) (37,122)
Manufacturing Industry 0.286 0.180 0.183
(Number of firms) (65) (14,118)
Technology Intensive Services 0.451 0.203 0.005
(Number of firms) (88) (10,934)
Other Business Related Services 0.334 0.198 0.224
(Number of firms) (63) (12,070)
VF: Venture-Funded; NVF: Non-Venture-Funded
*p-values express probabilities of Means
to be identical, based on a two sided t-test.
Table 2: Comparison of annual growth rates of venture funded and non venture funded firms
4 Description of the Evaluation Procedure
4.1 Background: Evaluation and The Selection Problem
To assess the contribution of venture capital funding to firms’ growth and innovative
behaviour, we aim to quantify the difference between the state of the firms after fund-
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Means p-value*
VF NVF
All Firms 1.084 0.134 0.000
(Number of firms) (274) (50,754)
Manufacturing Industry 2.524 0.265 0.000
(Number of firms) (82) (17,957)
Technology Intensive Services 0.620 0.090 0.000
(Number of firms) (108) (14,919)
Other Business Related Services 0.274 0.052 0.122
(Number of firms) (84) (17,878)
VF: Venture-Funded; NVF: Non-Venture-Funded
*p-values express probabilities of Means
to be identical, based on a two sided t-test.
Table 3: Comparison of patenting behaviour of venture funded and non venture funded firms
ing and the hypothetical state of their innovative behaviour if they had not been funded
by a venture capitalist. This latter state – called counterfactual – is of course hypo-
thetical i.e. it is not observable, and therefore has to be estimated (e.g. Heckman et al.,
1999). Denote Y1 the outcome of the target variable of treated firms (in our case the
innovative behaviour of venture funded) firms and Y0 the outcome of this variable
for non-treated firms. Then the evaluation task is expressed formally as measuring the
average treatment effect
θ1  E ¯Y1 ¯Y0VC  1  E ¯Y1VC  1E ¯Y0VC  1
  
c

where c denotes the counterfactual. If we were able to assume that venture capital
funded firms did not differ significantly non-funded firms in their characteristics, it
would be straightforward to estimate this counterfactual using observations on the
latter. However, two factors will lead to a selection bias that makes it impossible to
maintain this assumption. First, venture capitalists are investing only into those ven-
ture firms that have survived an extensive pre-investment screening process. That is,
venture funded firms have been selected in on the basis of superior performance. Sec-
ond, firms can be exptected to self-select into venture funding e.g. if they consider
themselves not to be able to pass the screening process. These firms would even not
expose themselves to a selection process. Hence, a priori, non venture funded firms
are not suitable for comparison with their venture funded counterparts (Lechner, 1998
discusses this problem in extend).
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Table 1 makes these differences explicit. However, given the structural differences
between those firms and the implied selection bias, this cannot yet be taken as evidence
in favour of a positive contribution of venture funding to firm growth or to firms’ inno-
vative behaviour. This selection bias can be corrected for by explicitly modelling the
selection process. Different approaches have been suggested to doing so (e.g. Heck-
man et al.(1999) or Keilbach(2003) for a survey). In this paper we choose a statistical
matching procedure, to be described in the following section.
4.2 Description of the Matching Procedure
Any microeconomic evaluation study would be straightforward if participants (i.e. the
“treated” firms in our case) are chosen at random and the number of firms is sufficiently
large to assure that we can find identical (“twin”) firms, one of which is treated while
the other is not. This approach of randomized experiment is used in other disciplines
such as pharmaceutics. However, due to the selection bias discussed above, we cannot
expect such a random assignment4
Assume however that we can identify a set of k variables X that are correlated with
the selection process. The conditional independence assumption (CIA), put forward by
Rubin(1977) states that different firms with however identical realizations of Xi differ
in their target variable Yi significantly only, through the implications of their treatment.
Put formally, in the case of venture capital financing, the CIA states
EY0VC  1X  x  EY0VC  0X  x
where VC  1 indicates venture capital financing. If this assumption is met, the average
treatment effect θ1 can be estimated as
θ1  E ¯Y1VC  1X  xE ¯Y0VC  0X  x
Given however the large number of variables, their metric nature and the implied high
dimensionality of the matching procedure it is virtually impossible to find two firms
with identical realisation of X.5 That is, it is virtually impossible to find exact (i.e.
“twin”) pairs venture funded an non venture funded firms.
4In setting up public policy measures, such experiments would amount to undertaking a social ex-
periment, which is explicitly prohibited by law in a number of countries. In the case of venture capital
financing, such experiments would presumambly not correspond to the interest of the venture capitalist
since his interest is not into evaluation but rather into earning miney.
5The first column of Table 1 enumerates the variables in the database.
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Rosenbaum and Rubin(1983) show that if there exists a function b :  k  1 , the
use of bX is equivalent, i.e. the average treatment effect θ1 can be estimated with
θ1  E ¯Y1VC  1bX  bxE ¯Y0VC  0bX  bx
Once this function is identified, the matching task simplifies considerably since the di-
mensionality of the task reduces to 1 and a corresponding agent can be found through
a nearest-neighbor Matching Method (Heckman et al., 1999, p. 1953). An intuitive
and often used realization of b is the propensity score that expresses the firms’ con-
ditional probability (the ”propensity”) to be subject to venture funding(conditional on
X). This probability can be estimated with a standard Probit model. That is we have
EVCixi  PrVCi  1xi  Φxiβ  i  12   N
where Φ represents the cumulated density function of the standard normal distribu-
tion.
Based on these estimation results, it is possible to compute each firm’s propensity
score via
psi  x

i
β (2)
which is a scalar for each firm.6 With an estimated propensity score for each firm at
hand, the matching procedure simplifies to finding for each venture funded firm i a non
venture funded counterpart j such as to mini jpsi ps j.7 Once the matching partners
are identified (i.e. we have determined Y c), we can estimate the average treatment
effect (i.e. the average contribution of venture capital funding to firms’ innovative be-
havior) consistently as (Lechner, 1998)
ˆθ1  1
N1

N1
∑
i1
Y 1i 
N1
∑
j1
Y cj

 (3)
The variance of ˆθ1 can be estimated with
Var

ˆθ1
	

1
N1

S12 Sc2
	
 (4)
S j being the standart deviation of subsample j.
6We give average values of estimations of the propensity score at the bottom of Table 1.
7A number of generalizations of this propensity score matching approach have been suggested. We
do not consider these here. See Heckman et al.(1999) or Keilbach(2003).
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4.3 Implementation and Result of the Matching Procedure
In the case of venture capital funding, variables that should enter X, i.e. variables
that can be expected to be responsible for selection into venture capital funding by
venture firms are mainly the industry to which the firm adheres and previous excellence
in innovation. We approximate self selection through contacts and networks through
locational variables, i.e. population density and distance to scientific facilities.8 Thus,
the matching approach assumes implicitly that both groups do not differ with respect to
unobservable variables such as commitment of firm founders or scope of the business
idea.
Based on this set of variables we run a probit estimation of the propensity score
using 142 venture funded firms and 21,571 control firms, results of which are repro-
duced in Table 4. These estimation results can be interpreted economically. Thus Table
4 provides evidence that firms size has a positive influence on the probability of being
venture funded or not. However, firms with limited legal forms are funded with sig-
nificantly higher probabity. The same applies for high education degrees and for firms
with more than two patents at foundation date or for firms founded after 1996. The
estimation results for industry variables point into the expected direction, i.e. firms
in R&D oriented industries are venture funded with higher probability. Again, this
probably reflects the recent dynamic evolution of the German venture capital market,
especially in for early stage investments. It is remarkable that the probabllity of being
venture funded decreases significantly with regional the density of scientific personnel.
We leave this for further investigation.
Based on the results of this estimation we can compute the propensity score for
each firm as is specified in equation (2). We then identify matching partners as de-
scribed above. Since the matching is made on the basis of a simple minimal distance
measure of each firm’s estimated propensity score, a necessary condition of this match-
ing to be successful is that the range of the propensity score of treated firms (venture
funded firms) is covered by the range of control firms.
8Indeed, venture funded firms and non-funded firms differ significantly respect to these variables.
See Table 1.
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Table 4: Determinants of venture capitalist’s involvement, Probit estima-
tion
Dependent Variable: Involvement of
venture capital Company within one year after foundation date
Characteristics at foundation date Coeff. p-value*
Firm-specific characteristics
Startup size (number of employees) 00080 0023
Limited Partnership (GmbH & Co. KG) 00810 0522
Public limited company (AG) 05964 0000
Involvement of other (non VC) firms 01996 0024
Team foundation 01977 0006
Founding team of mixed gender 01690 0128
Founders are of female gender 05302 0023
Gender Unknown 00159 0896
Qualification of Founders
Doctoral Degree 04158 0000
Postgraduate Degree 01448 0096
Higher Education on the Job 03187 0170
Low level of Education 00656 0772
Low Education 02799 0004
Patenting Behavior
One patent until foundation date 04426 0036
2...4 patent until foundation date 03657 0114
5...19 patent until foundation date 09311 0000
Industry affiliation (with NACE code)
Manuf. of food products etc. (15) 01601 0638
Manuf. of wearing apparel etc. (18) 04644 0242
Manuf. of wood and its products etc. (20) 02462 0384
Publishing, printing etc. (22) 01725 0447
Manuf. of chemicals and chemical products (24) 02364 0317
Manuf. of rubber and plastic products (25) 02004 0575
Manuf. of other non-metallic mineral products (26) 00451 0849
Manuf. of fabricated metal products etc. (28) 01575 0478
Manuf. of machinery and equipment n.e.c. (29) 03049 0197
Manuf. of office machinery and computers (30) 02841 0289
Manuf. of electrical machinery and apparatus n.e.c. (31) 05718 0005
Manuf. of radio, television and communication equipment (32) 03221 0230
Manuf. of medical, precision and optical instruments etc. (33) 00055 0976
Manuf. of motor vehicles, trailers and semi-trailers (34) 00653 0810
Manuf. of furniture; manufacturing n.e.c. (36) 01284 0711
Recycling (37) 03057 0219
Continued on next page
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Table 4: (continued)
Dependent Variable: Involvement of
venture capital Company within one year after foundation date
Characteristics at foundation date Coeff. p-value*
Post and telecommunications (64) 00092 0984
Computer and related activities (72) 02020 0123
Research and development (73) 05732 0000
Other business activities (740) 01671 0682
Business Related Services (741) 00312 0818
Architectural and engineering activitiesx (742) 02780 0093
Advertising (744) 00917 0617
Foundation date
1996 00232 0865
1997 03319 0008
1998 03445 0006
Regional Characteristics
Firm is located in Eastern Germany 00652 0515
Located in Bavaria 00920 0337
Firm is located in Brandenburg 01114 0610
Population Density in 1996 (corresponding counties) 00869 0056
Distance to nearest science or technology part 00124 0711
Scientific personnel in Universities within 50 km dist. 00609 0009
Distance to next Fraunhofer-Institute 00043 0904
Distance to next Helmholtz-Institute 00295 0332
R&D-employees in resp, industry 00359 0218
constant 35279 0000
Number of Observations (of which venture funded) 21571 142
Wald-test (p-value) 3329 0000
Pseudo R2 01548
*p-value: Probability of coefficient estimate to differ significantly from zero.
Data sources: ZEW Foundation Panels, Germany Patent Agency,
Federal Office for Regional Planning.
5 Results
We are now able to compute the average treatment effects and their standard devi-
ation as expressed in equations (3) and (4). Since we consider two implications of
venture-funding (firms’ growth and innovation) simultaneously, we run two different
realizations of the matching procedure. In both runs, we used the estimated propensity
score. Moreover, we imposed matching partners to be of the same industry and to be
16 ZEW Discussion Paper 02-82
founded in the same year. We also want matching partners to be as similar as possible
with respect to startup size when analyzing firm growth and with respect to the num-
ber of patents at firm-foundation when analyzing innovation behaviour. We therefore
imposed for matching partners the metric distance of these variables to be minimal.
5.1 Estimated Differences for Firm Growth
Table 5 shows the difference for the annual growth rates of both types of firms. venture
funded firms show a significant larger (more than twice as large) annual growth rate in
comparison to their non venture funded homologues. This difference is significant and
its magnitude is roughly the same for firms in the East- and West-German subsample
and for firms in different industry subsamples. Contrarily to the results in Table 2, the
differences now are all significant. Obviously, in the data underlying Table 2 there were
fast growing firms in the manufacturing sector and in the other business related services
that were not venture funded. The differenceis however much lower in magnitude than
in other studies such as e.g. Coopers&Lybrand and EVCA. This result clearly shows
the effect of the correction of the sample selection bias as effectuated by the matching
procedure.
Difference and significance are strongest for firms founded in 1998. This is the year
(together with 1999), where the venture capital market has experienced its strongest
boom. We therefore hypothesize that this boom had a strong influence on the devel-
opement of venture funded firms.
5.2 Estimated Differences for Innovative Behaviour of Firms
A different picture occurs if we consider the patenting behaviour of firms. As Table 6
shows, venture funded firms show still a stronger innovative behaviour9, however this
difference is only weakly significant. While it is significant at the 10% level for the
complete set of matched firms, it is not significant anymore for the industry aggregates,
nor for the tow regional subsets. The difference is weakly significant for firms created
in 1997 but not for other cohorts.
Hence, the overwhelming evidence is that once we correct for the number of patent
application at firm-foundation, venture-funding does not make a significant contribu-
tion to firms’ patenting behaviour. This result contradicts those of Table 3. Implicitely,
it also contradicts the findings of Kortum and Lerner(2000).
9Indeed, the difference is roughly in the same magnitude as in Table 3.
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Table 5: Employment growth of venture funded new firms and difference to control group
Average
Growth Rate
# of Firms VF NVF p-value*
All Firms 142 0.326 0.156 0000
By Region
West Germany 113 0.300 0.143 0002
East Germany 29 0.427 0.199 0046
By Industry Affiliation
Manufacturing Industry 44 0.299 0.110 0022
Technology Intensive Services 50 0.317 0.181 0043
Other Business Related services 48 0.361 0.173 0046
By Foundation Date
1995 / 1996 29 0.151 0.130 0749
1997 53 0.274 0.170 0158
1998 60 0.457 0.157 0000
Notes: VF: Venture-Funded; NVF: Non-Venture-Funded
*p-value: Probability of difference to be insignificant, based on a two sided t-test.
6 Summary
In this paper, we investigate the implication of venture capital funding on firms’ growth
performance and innovative behaviour. This is done using a sample of roughly 50,000
German firms of which roughly 1 per-cent is venture funded. We find evidence that
firms with higher innovative output (measured by patent applications, corrected for
size) and with a higher educated management have a larger probability of being venture
funded.
Then we compare venture funded and non venture funded firms with respect to
growth and innovative behaviour. This is done using a statistical matching approach
that compares venture funded firms with non venture funded “twin”-firms. The aim
of this approach is to make sure that the results are not biased with respect to firms
characteristics.
Based on this approach we find evidence that venture funded firms display sig-
nificantly higher growth rates compared to their non venture funded homologues. On
the other hand, there is only very weak evidence for the innovative behaviour of both
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Table 6: Difference of Patenting behaviour between venture funded new firms and control group
Average Number
of Patents
# of Firms VF NVF p-value*
All Firms 142 0.732 0.070 0087
By Region
West German Firms 113 0.336 0.061 0101
East German Firms 29 2.276 0.120 0226
By Industy Affiliation
Manufacturing Industry 44 1.545 0.091 0211
Technology Intensive Services 50 0.520 0.100 0230
Other Business Related services 48 0.208 0.021 0322
By Foundation Date
1995 / 1996 29 2.138 0.276 0293
1997 53 0.623 0.019 0082
1998 60 0.150 0.017 0177
Notes: VF: Venture-Funded; NVF: Non-Venture-Funded
*p-value: Probability of difference to be insignificant, based on a two sided t-test.
groups to be different.
In our view, these results can be interpreted as follows: venture capital firms screen
potential portfolio firms to select out those with the best growth perspectives. The in-
novative potential (as signalled by patent applications and by the founders’ education
levels) play an important role in that respect. This screening process is very selective
though successful since venture capital funded firms display indeed higher (twice as
large) growth rate as compared to firms of a control group. This stronger growth rate
seems to be a result of a commercialization of previous innovations since innovation
outputs of venture funded firms do not differ from non venture funded but otherwise
strongly similar group of firms of a control group. A plausible explanation for this
finding could be that venture capital investors assist their portfolio firms in this com-
mercialization effort, rather than in further innovation effort, in an attempt to maximize
sales, hence value, of their portfolio firms. Commercialization is probably done by fi-
nancial means but also by means of management assistance. It is also possible that
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venture investors are more aware of possible commercialization channels. However,
these hypotheses need further investigation. Nevertheless, these findings underline the
importance of commercialisation and marketing of innovation. Non venture funded
firms might improve their growth perspectives by putting mor emphasis on these as-
pects of the business. Again, this is left further research.
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